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Abstract
I study how firms actually compete in nonlinear tariffs by analyzing whether the incumbent and entrant’s
decisions to offer a given number of tariff options are interrelated. The goal is to shed some light on those
dynamic and strategic aspects of tariff menus that are currently ignored by theoretical models of nonlinear
pricing competition in order to highlight some basic features of the market that future theoretical work
should address. This paper also introduces a generalized multivariate count data model that allows to
account for the possibility of correlation of any sign among the pricing decisions of competing firms in a
manner that is robust to the existence of over and underdispersion of counts. Pricing strategies appear
to be strategic complements that respond positively to the existing heterogeneity of consumers’ tastes.
While this is a common source driving the number of tariff options offered, results also show that previous
pricing decisions by the incumbent affect the entrant’s current offering of tariff options, thus free riding
on information about the market revealed by the likely better informed firm of the industry. The strategic
complementarity result disappears when we only consider non-dominated tariffs.
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1 Introduction
Firms engaging in nonlinear pricing rarely make use of fully nonlinear tariffs. Actually firms only offer few
tariff options that approximate the fully nonlinear tariff. Thus, their pricing strategy consist of a bundle
of countable features that characterizes each tariff option. A tariff option can therefore be interpreted as
defined on a lattice of tariff features to accommodate the framework popularized by Milgrom and Roberts
(1990a) and Topkis (1998) for environments where firms’ strategies are discrete and their decision problems
fail to be convex.
In addition, when firms compete, their pricing tactics may have important strategic effects: offering
more or less tariff options may induce consumers to switch carriers or to induce different type of customers
to subscribe each company. Thus, the offering of numerous tariff options by one carrier may trigger a
similar response for the competitor if the number of tariff options are strategic complements,1 or a smaller
number of options if they are strategic substitutes. In this latter case, competing firmsmay differentiate their
otherwise (almost) identical products through tariff design by appealing to customers that are significantly
heterogeneous regarding the different features of the tariff options, e.g., such as their complexity.
This is a rather unexplored area of nonlinear pricing that the present paper intends to document
using the competitive telephone pricing of the early US cellular telephone industry between 1984 and
1992. This market was characterized by minimal product differentiation, lack of network externalities,
and transition from monopoly to duopoly during the early years of the sample. The goal of the paper is
not to develop a theory of how firms would incorporate different features of the tariff in competition but
to document how they actually do so in a simplified setting so that this empirical evidence may serve as
a reference for future research in this area of nonlinear pricing. Hence, this paper explores whether the
existing theoretical models of nonlinear pricing competition can produce some sort of robust prediction to
test à la Chiappori and Salanié (2000) if there is any strategic value attached to competing for customers
through the design of tariff features, and in particular regarding the number of tariff options offered. I
show that when we shift the attention from agents’ choices to the principals’ offering of contract options,
such robust test does not exists. The reason is that there are few theoretical models advancing competing
hypotheses, some of which support the idea of minimal tariff differentiation while others envision tariff
options as a way to segment the market when other sources or differentiation are ineffective. Moreover,
if firms face non-negligible commercialization costs per tariff option and if it is likely that these costs
are different across firms, then any combination of number of tariff options can be rationalized as profit
maximizing regardless of other elements of the model such as product differentiation or the distribution of
consumer types. The reason is that these commercialization costs remain unobserved to the econometrician.
1 See Milgrom and Roberts (1990b) and Vives (1990) for a theoretical treatment of strategic complementarities when firms’
strategies are not continuous.
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In this paper I only focus on the number of tariff options offered by the competing firms of the
largest U.S. cellular telephone markets between 1984 and 1992. I ignore other tariff features such as length
of the contract, bundling with particular telephone sets, or magnitude of the allowance of each tariff plan.
These features certainly have an effect on the decision to subscribe to a particular plan and/or carrier,
but the information on most of them is quite incomplete. Thus, I will focus on the number of tariff plans
only and presume that there is significant unobserved heterogeneity that needs to be dealt with at the
econometric stage. Miravete and Pernías (2006) empirically test for the existence of complementarity among
the binary strategies of a firm. Alternatively, this paper focuses on the existence of strategic complementarity
among the pricing tactics of competing firms.
In attempting to measure whether there is any strategic complementarity in offering more or less
tariff options to compete for a common pool of potential customers, the econometric analysis needs to
address the estimation of a multivariate count data regression model. The estimates reported here are the
result of estimating a pseudo-maximum likelihood procedure based on a Gaussian copula function with
double Poisson marginals that uniquely accommodates the observed underdispersion of the distribution
of the number of tariffs and the possibility of negative correlation among the distribution of tariff options
of the incumbent and entrant in the early U.S. cellular telephone industry. It should be noted that this
estimation approach is the first one that allows to control for any combination of over and underdispersed
distribution of counts together with the possibility of negative correlation among the number of tariff
options offered by the competing firms. This is a sensible economic hypothesis that cannot be ruled out
by imposing a positive correlation leading necessarily to conclude that the number of tariff options offered
by competing firms are strategic complements. Furthermore, and contrary to any existing multivariate
count data model, the consistent estimates are robust to the existence of unobserved heterogeneity leading
to over and underdispersion of counts and the estimation approach, which avoids numerical integration,
proves to be fast and easy to implement.
Results support the existence of strategic complementarity and thus, competition leads to minimal
differences among the pricing tactics of competing cellular firms. The similar number of tariff options
offered by incumbents and entrants may also indicate that there are no significant differences in com-
mercialization costs across firms. More options are offered in more affluent markets and where there is
evidence that consumers are more heterogeneous to better segment them and add to profits by reducing
their informational rents.
The number of tariff options offered also increases over time although this is no longer true for all
firms when we restrict our attention to non-dominated tariff options, i.e., those that for some non-negligible
number of consumption patters are at some point the least expensive tariff options to subscribe. When we
consider these non-dominated tariff plans the strategic complementarity result disappears, indicating that
firms simply optimize how to best implement the nonlinear tariff schedule by means of a menu of few tariff
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options. This points out an interesting result that complements those described by Miravete (2007): it is
more likely that firms respond strategically to the number of tariff options offered by the competitor when
these are mostly deceptive tariff options aimed to benefit from consumers mistakes.
Finally, the larger the number of effective tariff options offered by the incumbent during the
monopoly phase in each market the more effective options are offered by the entrant. Firms imitate their
competitors in an attempt to take advantage of their market research but this does not amount to the strate-
gic complementarity of effective tariffs as a mechanism to segment the market and attract customers from
the competitor’s clientele. The data can only identify the effect of entrants learning out of the incumbent’s
supposedly better knowledge of the market.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 reviews different the-
oretical arguments that may help explaining the number of tariff plans that firms offer to their customers
in competitive environments. Section 4 presents a feasible multivariate count data regression model based
on the Gaussian copula and double Poisson distribution. Section 5 reports the results of this bivariate
count data regression model in which the number of total and non-dominated tariff options offered by each
firm is regressed against market and firm characteristics. This section also suggests interpretations that
are consistent with the reported results and evaluates the existence of strategic complementarities among
firms’ offerings of tariff plans. Section 6 concludes.
2 Pricing in the Early U.S. Cellular Industry
This paper studies the pricing strategies of numerous cellular telephone carriers in the early U.S. cellular
telephone industry. In particular, I focus on the number of tariff options that firms use to implement a
fully nonlinear tariff. The data set, which has been described at length elsewhere,2 contains a complete
description of the tariff options offered by any of the two firms present in the largest markets of the U.S. be-
tween 1984 and 1988. The data, however, do not include subscription, neither individual consumption
information, but it contains a large number of market and firm characteristics that can be used to control
for the existence of firm and market specific heterogeneity. These data therefore do not allow me to analyze
consumers’ preferences for tariff options with different features such as in Economides, Seim, and Viard
(2006) or Lambrecht, Seim, and Skiera (2006). The data are better suited to test for the existence of strategic
complementarities among strategies that are countable and discrete in nature. Thus, I will focus on the
contemporaneous interaction of firms’ strategies regarding the number of tariff options offered.3 As in
2 See for instance Busse (2000), Miravete (2007), Miravete and Röller (2004), and Parker and Röller (1997).
3 Busse (2000) focuses on exactly how similar are those other features of cellular tariffs when firms are present in several
markets and Busse and Rysman (2005) study the different degree of concavity of nonlinear tariffs in yellow book advertising.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Incumbent Entrant All Firms
Variables Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
PLANS 3.6970 1.2244 3.6465 1.2561 3.6717 1.2374
EFFPLANS 3.2020 1.2287 3.2020 1.2370 3.2020 1.2297
LASTMONO 1.5152 1.9025 1.5152 1.9025 1.5152 1.8977
LSTEFMON 1.1515 1.4240 1.1515 1.4240 1.1515 1.4204
YEAR88 0.3333 0.4738 0.3333 0.4738 0.3333 0.4726
YEAR92 0.3333 0.4738 0.3333 0.4738 0.3333 0.4726
FIRM-AGE 45.3030 31.5919 34.6432 30.5769 39.9731 31.4666
BELL 0.6667 0.4738 0.3030 0.4619 0.4848 0.5010
POVERTY 10.4505 2.7936 10.4505 2.7936 10.4505 2.7865
APpeak 0.2288 0.2606 0.2210 0.2812 0.2249 0.2705
APoff−peak 0.1526 9.5539 -1.4083 11.8900 -0.6279 10.7864
COVERAGE 0.0964 0.0789 0.0964 0.0789 0.0964 0.0787
Observations 99 99 198
All variables are defined in main text.
Miravete (2007), I will distinguish however between actual and non-dominated tariffs to uncover whether
the strategic interaction has anything to do with deceptive tactics.
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics by type of firms.4 The first variable, PLANS, denotes
the number of actual tariff options offered by different firms at different points in time. This information
was collected by Economic and Management Consultants International, Inc. and reported in Cellular Price
and Marketing Letter, Information Enterprises, various issues, 1984–1988. For year 1992, Marciano (2000)
combined information from Cellular Directions, Inc., the Cellular Telephone Industry Association, and direct
interviews with managers. Some of the tariff options offered were always more expensive than some
others, or a combination of the other options offered by the same firm. Thus, EFFPLANS indicates the
number of effective tariff options, i.e., those that are the least expensive option for at least one out of the half
a million usage profiles defined by the sum of peak and off-peak minutes adding up to a maximum of 1000
minutes of usage a month. LASTMONO and LSTEFMON are the number of actual and effective tariff options,
respectively, offered by the incumbent during the last quarter where it enjoyed its monopoly position.
Every firm is observed three times in this data set: at the earliest quarter of the duoply phase of the
market between 1984 and 1988, in the third quarter of 1988 (YEAR88), and in 1992 (YEAR92), respectively.
Depending on the time of the award of the wireline license to the incumbent firm and the court resolution
over the dispute for the awarding of the non-wireline license to an entrant, each firm accumulates a different
experience, measured by FIRM-AGE, at the time of each observation. In addition to all these time related
variables, BELL indicates whether the largest shareholder of each firm belongs to one of the “Baby Bells”
4 There is more information available, but the limited size of the sample and the nonlinear nature of the estimation model
prompted us to select a small number of regressors capable of producing meaningful results.
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Table 2: Frequency Distributions of Number of Actual and Effective Tariff Options
Incumbent Entrant All Firms
Actual Options Cases Rel.Freq. Cases Rel.Freq. Cases Rel.Freq.
1 2 0.0202 6 0.0606 8 0.0404
2 18 0.1818 11 0.1111 29 0.1465
3 22 0.2222 26 0.2626 48 0.2424
4 28 0.2828 31 0.3131 59 0.2980
5 24 0.2424 19 0.1919 43 0.2172
6 5 0.0505 6 0.0606 11 0.0556
Mean, (Var.) 3.6969 (1.4991) 3.6464 (1.5778) 3.6717 (1.5113)
Incumbent Entrant All Firms
Effective Options Cases Rel.Freq. Cases Rel.Freq. Cases Rel.Freq.
1 8 0.0808 10 0.1010 18 0.0909
2 24 0.2424 17 0.1717 41 0.2071
3 25 0.2525 33 0.3333 58 0.2929
4 24 0.2424 23 0.2323 47 0.2374
5 18 0.1818 14 0.1414 32 0.1616
6 0 0.0000 2 0.0202 2 0.0101
Mean, (Var.) 3.2020 (1.5098) 3.2020 (1.5302) 3.2020 (1.5123)
Absolute and relative frequency distribution of the number of actual and non-dominated tariff options offered by each
active firm.
(available from the Federal Communications Commission); and POVERTY reports the percentage of households
with income below the poverty level according to the 1989 Statistical Abstracts of the United States.
The data include some potentially endogenous variables to describe some relevant features of the
tariff andmarket where these firms operate. These variables are the curvature of the peak and off-peak tariff
schedule as defined by APpeak and APoff−peak, and the ratio of total to potential subscribers, COVERAGE.
Variable APpeak is the equivalent of the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion computed over a thousand
minute interval of airtime usage by means of the quadratic polynomial that best fits the lower envelope of
the peak component of the tariff. Variable APoff−peak is similarly computed using the off-peak component of
the tariff instead. The idea behind thesemeasures of risk aversion is that themore heterogeneous consumers
are, in the sense the distribution of their taste has a higher hazard rate, the more concave the optimal tariff
needs to be. If all consumers are alike, a single two-part tariff suffices to extract all the rents from consumers.
Evidently, the degree of concavity computed makes use of the actual tariffs offered, and thus, these two
variables may be endogenous. Finally, COVERAGE is defined as the maximum capacity installed (measured
by the number of antennas × 1,300 customers) divided by the number of business in a particular city
and the population divided by four (to approximate the number of households). This variable may also be
endogenous as the participation decision of consumers may depend on tariff options tailored to their tastes.
Thus, more numerous and less expensive options could lead to significantly higher participation rates.
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Table 3: Contemporaneous Correlation Among Number of Tariff Options
Actual 1 2 3 4 5 6 Kendall’s τ
1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0.3668
2 4 6 5 2 1 0 (5.38)
3 0 1 10 6 3 2
4 0 3 6 11 6 2
5 1 1 3 9 9 1
6 0 0 1 3 0 1
Effective 1 2 3 4 5 6 Kendall’s τ
1 5 0 1 1 1 0 0.3280
2 1 10 8 4 1 0 (4.81)
3 0 4 12 5 3 1
4 3 2 9 7 3 0
5 1 1 3 6 6 1
6 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total cases for each combination of tariff options offered by the incumbent and entrant firm. Rows indicate
the number of options of the entrant and columns those of the incumbent. Kendall’s τ measures of the
association among the number of tariff options. The corresponding absolute value t-statistics are shown in
parentheses. There are 99 pairs of tariff strategies in the sample.
Table 2 presents the histogram of the actual and effective number of tariff options by type of cellular
carrier. Firms in this early market offered fewer tariff options than what is thought of being customary
today. It is noticeable though that while the number of effective tariff options is always smaller than the
actual number of options, the difference is not excessive. Another remarkable feature of the data is that
the distribution of plans is always underdispersed, i.e., the variance of the distribution of number of plans
never exceeds the mean, which is the opposite of what is normally encountered in dealing with count data.
Table 3 cross-tabulates the occurrences of the different strategies and is the first piece of evidence
in favor of strategic complementarities in the number of tariff options. Regardless of whether we focus on
the actual or on the effective number of tariff options, it is very infrequent to observe one firm offering only
one or two options while the other attempts to segment the market by flooding customers with numerous
choices. Most of the time, firms offer between 2 and 4 options while the competitor offers a similar number,
differing at most in one option.
3 Competing through Tariff Design
Within the monopoly framework the actual implementation of nonlinear pricing through a menu of few
tariff options can be rationalized quite easily:
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• Discrete Types. One possibility is that the support of the distribution of types is discrete. Consumers
purchase cellular, local, and long distance telephony, cable or satellite TV, and high speed internet
access. In choosing which combination of these services to bundle what matters is the demand for
access rather than usage and thus, in this example, any potential consumer type could be represented
by one of the 25 nodes of a five dimensional lattice.5
• Commercialization Costs. The optimal screening of consumers with different willingness to pay in-
volves quantity discounts when the distribution of types is well behaved and its support is compact.6
Thus, the foregone profits of offering an additional tariff option (normally a two-part tariff or a
"bucket" tariff that includes some free minutes associated to the fixed monthly fee) decreases rapidly
with the number of tariff options as proven by Wilson (1993, §8.3). An equilibrium with a menu
with few tariff options could therefore be easily justified as long as there is a sufficiently large fixed
commercialization cost per tariff.
For the case of cellular telephone consumption it is appropriate to model consumers heterogeneity
regarding cellular telephone usage as a continuous random variable with compact support. We do not
expect that consumers only use 50, 110, or 137 minutes a month and not any other potential number of
minutes. Thus, provided that the distribution of usage is well behaved, few tariff options are needed to
implement any fully nonlinear tariff in the presence of commercialization costs.7
The commercialization costs argument shows that models of nonlinear pricing cannot provide with
a robust empirical implication regarding how firms implement such contracts through simple menus of tar-
iff options. This critique is valid both for monopoly and oligopoly nonlinear pricing models. Commercial-
ization costs are generally unobservable to the econometrician, and thus, any combination of tariff options
can be offered by competing firms if there is heterogeneity regarding unobserved commercialization costs
across firms and markets.
Relative to the theoretical body dealing with monopoly nonlinear pricing, models of nonlinear
pricing competition are still in its infancy. Perhaps the most interesting result of this limited literature
is the fact that duopolists, once they serve the whole market, will offer a single two-part tariff to their
customers if they are unable to differentiate their products at all. This result, simultaneously obtained by
Armstrong and Vickers (2001) and Rochet and Stole (2002), suggests that firms should offer few rather
5 Crawford and Shum (2006) make explicit use of the discrete support of types defined on bundles of channels to study price
discounts in cable television.
6 Besides the single crossing property, it is normally required that the single dimensional distribution of types fulfills the
increasing hazard rate property. See for instance Maskin and Riley (1984).
7 The fact that foregone profits decrease rapidly with the number of tariffs was first pointed out by Faulhaber and Panzar
(1977) and formally proven by Wilson (1993, §8.3). Recently, Rogerson (2003) and Chu and Sappington (2007) have documented the
large share of potential profits from fully nonlinear pricing that can be captured with just one simple two-part tariff.
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than numerous tariff options when they compete. But this is true only when we restrict our attention to
the symmetric equilibrium case without optimal exclusion of customers from the market. The assumption
of symmetric equilibrium is very common but it necessarily implies complementarity among the firms’
pricing strategies. The empirical rejection of a positive correlation among the number of effective tariff
options offered by competing firms does not support the idea of symmetric equilibrium as the only likely
outcome of nonlinear pricing games.
The early U.S. cellular telephone industry was far from becoming a mature industry over the
time period covered by the data. Investment in the deployment of antennas, high charges relative to
the inexpensive fixed line telephone, roaming, and a “consumer party pays” practice did not favor a
rapid adoption of cellular phones by consumers. Thus, it is very unlikely that all potential consumers
participate and nonlinear duopoly pricing does not collapses into a single two-part tariff per competing
firm. The hypothesis of minimal tariff differentiation is consistent with the exclusive agency model of Rochet
and Stole (2002). Firms face a similar underlying distribution of individual types and share not only the
same marginal cost but also the same commercialization costs. Thus, the optimal nonlinear tariff becomes
flatter as the possibility of extracting rents from consumers is reduced by the existence of competing firms.
Therefore, the foregone profits of not offering an additional tariff in competition become smaller than in
monopoly and fewer tariff options are needed to achieve certain percentage of the maximum profits from
a fully nonlinear tariff. These models predict simultaneous uniform reduction of the markup for any
consumption level as competition increases, something that the existing evidence does not support.8 In
fact, using the same data set of this paper, Miravete (2007) documents that entry of a second competitor
triggers an increase in the number of tariff options available to consumers after controlling for all available
firm and market specific characteristics. Similarly, Seim and Viard (2005) document that the number of
tariff options per carrier increased in this same market at a later stage when additional competitors were
allowed to enter as a result of the 1996 Telecommunications Act.
Confronting this view leading necessarily to the strategic complementarity of the number of tariff
options offered by competing cellular telephone carriers, Yang and Ye (2006) suggest that contract variety
depends on two opposite effects. First, as the number of firms increases each firm becomes less differen-
tiated and its residual demand becomes smaller. This market size effect is the only one considered in most
models cited above. Second, themarket share effect results fromfirms offering additional contracts when their
market share becomes too small and differentiating themselves through the contract features is the onlyway
to steal market share from competitors. The validity of this argument rests on the implicit assumption that
consumers types are multidimensional—as in Rochet and Stole (2002)— so that contract features may affect
the reservation utility of the potential clientele of these competing firms. Cellular telephone companies will
8 Other papers that lead to the same symmetric equilibrium where the number of tariff options of each firm are necessarily
strategic complements are those of Gal-Or (1988), Spulber (1989), Stole (1995), and Oren, Smith, and Wilson (1983).
– 8 –
offer more or less tariff options depending on how consumers value having to decide among numerous
contract alternatives and how effective is the differentiation through contract variety relative to the product
differentiation of the firm, i.e., it ultimately depends on how each dimension of consumers’ types enter their
preferences. This environment, with the proper asymmetric distribution of types for usage and contract
simplicity can explain situations where one firm offers many tariff options while competitors only offer a
few. When the number of tariff options are strategic substitutes firms make use of menu options to segment
the market and retain a profitable share of customers.
Therefore, firms may end up offering a similar number of options with almost identical features
while competing through the design of tariffs, or alternatively, use their number and features to differ-
entiate from each other. In all cases, features of tariffs unknown to the econometrician, the symmetry or
asymmetry of the distribution of types, also unknown to the econometrician, and the unobserved firm
specific commercialization costs drive the final decision on how many tariff options are offered. Thus, the
number of tariff options offered can either be strategic complements or substitutes. Hence, the answer to
this empirical question would depend on the specific study case. This paper reports the results for the early
U.S. cellular telephone market.
4 A Bivariate Double Poisson Count Data Regression Model
Regardless of whether we focus on the total number of tariff options offered by the competing firms or on
the number of effective (non-dominated) tariff options, Tables 2 and 3 present us with two features that
none of the existing count data regression models can handle simultaneously: the distribution of counts
appears to be underdispersed and positively correlated across firms. The bivariate Double Poisson count
data regression model is a flexible approach based on a Gaussian copula function with assumed double
Poissonmarginal distributions and correlation of unrestricted sign that can be easily implemented an allows
us to address simultaneously over or underdispersion and a potentially negative correlation of counts.
It has long been recognized that the Poisson model is in general too restrictive when estimating
univariate count data regressions. Implicit to the Poisson model is the assumption of equidispersion of the
distribution of counts, which is customarily rejected by the data. If the mean does not equal the variance of
the distribution of counts the estimates are still consistent but inference is no longer robust, e.g., Cameron
and Trivedi (1998, 3.1-3.4). Many models, such as the Negative Binomial regression, have been suggested
to address the existence of unobserved heterogeneity in the data that could explain the commonly observed
overdispersion of the count distribution although underdispersion cannot be addressed with the same
unobserved heterogeneity argument. However only Efron (1986) and Winkelmann (1995) suggests flexible
enough model to address both over and underdispersion of the distribution of counts.
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In presenting the econometric model, I will consider first the single equation count data regression
model behind the assumed double Poisson marginal distributions of the bivariate model. Let yi = 0, 1, 2, . . .
be distributed according to a double Poisson distribution with parameters µi and φi, conditional on a set of
regressors xi in a sample with j = 1, 2, . . . , n observations. Efron (1986) shows that the probability frequency
function of this double Poisson is:
f (yi, µi, φi | xi) = K(µi, φi)
√
φi exp(−φiµi) exp(−yi)yi
yi
yi!
(
eµi
yi
)φiyi
, (1a)
µi = exp(xi ′βi) , (1b)
1
K(µi, φi)
' 1+ 1− φi
12φiµi
(
1+
1
φiµi
)
. (1c)
The advantage of this distribution over the standard Poisson is that the mean and variance do
not depend on a single parameter, thus allowing for both over and underdispersion. Efron (1986) shows,
among many other results, that:
E[yi,j | xi,j] ' µi,j , (2a)
V[yi,j | xi,j] '
µi,j
φi,j
. (2b)
Hence, the double Poisson includes the standard Poisson as a particular case, when φi = 1, but it allows
for overdispersion when φi < 1 as well as for underdispersion when φi > 1. Furthermore, the maximum
likelihood first order conditions of the double Poison are:
n
∑
j=1
yi,j − µi,j
(µi,j/φi,j)
∂µi,j
∂βi
= 0 , (3)
which coincides with those of the standard Poisson regression model. The estimation of the parameters
of interest (β′i, φi)′ proceeds in two steps:9 First, a simple and fast iteratively reweighted least squares
procedure (Cameron and Trivedi (1998, §3.8)) is used to estimate the components of βi. After substituting
into equation (2a) to obtain µˆi,j, the maximum likelihood estimate of φi coincides with the sample mean of
the deviance measure (Cameron and Trivedi (1998, §5.3.2)):
φˆi =
n
∑
j=1
yi,j ln
(
yi,j
µˆi,j
)
− (yi,j − µˆi,j) . (4)
9This is without loss of generality when, as in the case considered here, φi is assumed to be a constant because in such case
the gradient characterizing the first order conditions of the maximum likelihood estimation is a block recursive system of equations
where φi does not enter into the equations determining the components of βi .
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Cameron and Trivedi (1998, §8) best summarize the difficulties of estimating a multivariate count
data regression. Tractability has limited the estimation of these kind of models. Among the better known
approaches Kocherlakota and Kocherlakota (1993) derive a bivariate Poisson distribution from two Poisson
distributed variables resulting from the addition of a common Poisson variable to two independently
distributed Poisson variables. The advantage of this approach —known as trivariate reduction— is that
it allows for Poisson marginal distributions and a positive, although restricted, correlation coefficient that
fully characterizes the dependence structure of variables. Similarly, Marshall and Olkin (1990) generate
a multivariate count data distribution from mixtures and convolutions of distributions of count events.
The advantage of this second approach is that it allows for the simultaneous existence of unobserved
heterogeneity conducting to overdispersion and positive correlation of counts. Still, regardless of whether
we focus on the bivariate Poisson distribution of Kocherlakota and Kocherlakota (1993), or the multivariate
negative binomial distribution of Marshall and Olkin (1990), correlation is necessarily positive because
there is a single source of heterogeneity to the distribution of the different counts that explains simultane-
ously overdispersion of the marginal distributions and their positive correlation. The moment approach of
Gourieroux, Monfort, and Trognon (1984) suffers from the same shortcomings.
The bivariate double Poisson count data regression model can accommodate both over and un-
derdispersion and allows for the possibility that counts are negatively correlated. Furthermore, these two
features of the joint distribution of counts are not driven by a common unobserved factor to all univariate
marginal distributions and the parameterization of the likelihood function allows for all possible combina-
tions of over or unnderdispersed marginals and correlation of any sign. Allowing for the estimation to be
flexible enough to accommodate the observed dispersion pattern in the data reduces the risk of misspec-
ification bias. This is also accomplished by not excluding the possibility of negative correlation between
the counts. Moreover, negative correlation is a sensible economic hypothesis for the present application
that cannot be simply ruled out by assuming any of the other multivariate count data models currently
available. A negative correlation estimate is consistent with the view that firms attempt to differentiate
themselves through the design of the tariff options that they offer to, most likely, endogenously segmented
and differentiated customers.
The present bivariate double Poisson model extends Efron (1986) approach to deal with multivari-
ate counts making use of Gaussian copula function.10 The clear advantage of this approach is that it is
easily implementable, with first order conditions identical to those of the Poisson model. Estimation is fast
and easy and only involves few computations beyond those of a pseudo-maximum likelihood count data
estimation in order to account for over/underdispersion and correlation between counts. This compares
10For a recent and up to date introduction to copulas see Nelsen (2006). Copulas have been used before in econometric
applications. Thus, Cameron, Li, Trivedi, and Zimmer (2004) apply the Frank (1979) copula to study the difference of positive count
data variables and Park and Fader (2004) make use of a Gamma-Sarmanov copula to analyze the joint distribution of waiting times to
repeated visits to a set of websites.
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quite positively with the existing literature on multivariate count data regression which normally require
heavy numerical integrations to evaluatemultivariate count series with only restricted correlation of counts.
To ease the exposition I will focus, without loss of generality, on the bivariate case that is the
objective of the present study. Let’s assume that (ϕ1, ϕ2) are two continuous variables with joint probability
density function F(ϕ1, ϕ2)with continuous univariate marginal probability distribution functions given by
Fi(ϕi), i = 1, 2. The basic result on copulas, first proven by Sklar (1959), states that the following copula
function C exists and is unique:
C : [0, 1]× [0, 1] ⇒ [0, 1], s.t. F(ϕ1, ϕ2) = C (F1(ϕ1), F2(ϕ2)) . (5)
Then the joint probability density function is just the product of the marginal density functions and the
copula density:
f (ϕ1, ϕ2) = f1(ϕ1) f2(ϕ2)
∂2C (F1(ϕ1), F2(ϕ2))
∂F1(ϕ1)∂F2(ϕ2)
. (6)
Thus, a bivariate copula with standard uniform marginals can always be written as follows:
C(z1, z2) = F
(
F−11 (z1), F
−1
2 (z2)
)
, (7)
for zi = Fi(qi), i = 1, 2, because qi = F−1i (zi) is always uniformly distributedwhen themarginal distribution
functions are continuous.11 The Gaussian copula simply assumes that F(·) and Fi(·) are the bivariate and
univariate standard normal distribution functions, respectively. This allows us to introduce the parameter
ρ of correlation among counts:
C(z1, z2, ρ) = Φ
(
Φ−11 (z1),Φ
−1
2 (z2), ρ
)
. (8)
In order to estimate this bivariate count data model with double Poisson marginals, we need to
maximize a log-likelihood function where the contribution of each observation j is:
log ( f (y1, y2, β1, β2, φ1, φ2, ρ | x1, x2) =
2
∑
i=1
log ( f (yi, µi, φi | xi)) + log (c(q1, q2, ρ)) , (9)
where fi(·) is the univariate probability density function of the double Poisson given by equation (1a), c(·)
is the probability density function of a standard bivariate normal distribution corresponding to (7), and:
qi = Φ−1i (zi), i = 1, 2. (10)
11A proof of this widely used result, known as the “probability integral transformation”, can be found in Casella and Berger
(2001, pp.52-54).
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Thus, the log-likelihood function of this model has two differentiated components consisting of the log-
likelihood functions of two separate double Poissons plus the term involving the copula that exclusively
determines ρ. Obtaining the value of parameters thus reduces to estimating two separate double Poisson
count data regression models as explained before, and then, once we substitute the estimates βˆ1, βˆ2, φˆ1,
and φˆ2 into c(·), obtain the estimate of ρ in a second stage simply as:
ρˆ = CORR(q1, q2) . (11)
The only remaining difficulty of this approach is that Fi(ϕi) is not continuous, but rather a discrete
marginal distribution function defined on N. Denuit and Lambert (2005) provide the solution to this prob-
lem by adding an independent random draw from a standard uniform distribution ui,j to each count yi,j
so that the newly generated continuous distributions preserve the same association measure (Kendall’s τ)
than the original discrete distributions.12 Fixing this problem only adds a simple step to properly defining
zi in equation (10) as the probability integral transformation of the continued variable associated to yi. Let
F?i (y
?
i ) denote the new continuous marginal distribution function of the continued variable:
y?i,j = yi,j + (ui,j − 1) . (12)
Then:
zi,j = F?i (y
?
i,j) = Fi(yi,j − 1) + fi(yi,j) · ui,j , (13)
where Fi(·) and fi(·) correspond, respectively, to the probability distribution and frequency functions of the
double Poisson of equation (1a).
Thus, the combination of a Gaussian copula with double Poisson marginals reduces the estima-
tion of a multivariate count data regression model to an easy sequence of univariate generalized linear
regressions and the robust estimation of the correlation between the error terms of these equations. This
procedure is easy to implement and produces consistent estimates of the parameters in a three sequen-
tial stages that allow to accommodate any combination of over and underdispersion of counts plus any
correlation pattern between the counts. Inference will be based on bootstrapped standard errors.
5 Estimation Results
Table 4 reports the estimates of this model for the actual and effective number of tariff options, respectively.
The estimates reflect that the distribution of actual tariff plans is underdispersed (φi > 1 for both firms)
12This continuation procedure is applied by Heinen and Rengifo (2003) in the context of an autoregressive count data model.
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Table 4: Number of Tariffs
Actual Effective
Variables Incumbent Entrant Incumbent Entrant
CONSTANT 3.4170 2.8483 2.3359 1.2932
(3.40) (2.83) (2.61) (1.64)
FIRM-AGE -0.0151 -0.0089 -0.0049 -0.0007
(0.96) (0.64) (0.42) (0.03)
BELL 0.5362 0.3045 -0.0180 0.3269
(1.68) (1.11) (0.07) (1.07)
POVERTY -0.1292 -0.1608 -0.1385 -0.0889
(2.02) (3.02) (2.38) (1.87)
LASTMONO/ LSTEFMON 0.0525 0.0716 0.0343 0.1023
(0.55) (1.43) (0.45) (2.21)
YEAR88 0.8788 0.6395 0.4427 0.3974
(1.58) (1.58) (1.11) (0.79)
YEAR92 2.2780 2.0432 1.5640 1.4542
(1.85) (2.04) (1.79) (1.05)
APpeak 0.9248 0.6255 1.2883 0.8658
(1.72) (1.74) (2.82) (2.16)
APoff−peak -0.0083 -0.0267 -0.0057 -0.0116
(0.39) (0.85) (0.29) (0.27)
COVERAGE 0.5946 -0.1875 0.1438 -0.0982
(0.96) (0.25) (0.26) (0.18)
φi 1.0946 1.0780 0.9528 0.9398
(23.54) (20.74) (19.13) (17.44)
ρ 0.3595 0.1285
(3.66) (1.21)
Observations 99 99 99 99
–ln L 159.19 156.37 151.98 151.52
LM 1.6933 1.2914 3.6872 2.3916
[p− value] [0.429] [0.524] [0.158] [0.302]
Marginal effects evaluated at the sample mean of regressors. Absolute value, bootstrapped, t-statistics are reported
between parentheses using 100 replications in each case. LM is the regression-based, heteroskedastic-robust, Lagrange
multiplier test of endogeneity of Wooldridge (1997) for APpeak, APoff−peak, and COVERAGE. LM is asymptotically dis-
tributed as a χ23 distribution under the null hypothesis of exogeneity and p-values are shown between brackets.
while the distribution of only effective tariff options is overdispersed (φi < 1 also for both firms). Fur-
thermore, the number of actual tariff options offered are strategic complements (ρ > 0) but the evidence
does not support the existence of such strategic complementarity when we restrict our attention to non-
dominated tariffs. Thus, once we account for relevant market and firm characteristics, these results support
the interpretation that firms act independently of each other when implementing the optimal nonlinear
tariff by means of a menu of few non-dominated tariff options. Still, they imitate each other if we consider
the actual number of tariff options that include deceptive pricing. Thus, at this early stage of development
of the cellular telephone industry, the evidence favors the minimal tariff differentiation of Rochet and Stole
(2002) than the view of Yang and Ye (2006) when we focus on the total offering of tariff options. This is,
on the other hand also consistent with the view of these latter authors. In this early industry the market
is far from saturated and only two firms still can find a substantial share of customers to sign in without
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the need of having to steel customers from the competitor through other pricing tactics. In support of this
view, notice that the effect of COVERAGEis never significant.
Table 4 also provides with other results that support the interpretation that pricing tactics, as
defined by the actual number of options, are strategic complements. Thus, for instance, there is no effect
of learning attributable to the experience accumulated by each firm in a particular market (non-significant
FIRM-AGE). Similarly, the number of tariff options offered to consumers are independent of the ownership
of the carrier. These two results favor the interpretation that firm differences associated to the cost of
commercializing tariff options is negligible. This is true for the case of effective tariffs although BELL owned
companies are marginally more likely to offer more tariff options, including deceptive ones.
The discrepancy on the complementarity result when we consider total and effective tariff options
needs to be explored. An important result is the positive and significant effect of APpeak on the effective
number of tariff options, a result that is only marginally significant in the case of total tariff plans. This is
important because the peak time band comprises at this early stage of the industry more than twelve hours
a day and constitute the bulk of the market, clearly made mostly of business and high income individuals.
The negative effect of POVERTY confirms that this is luxury good (handsets were initially priced at $3,000)
and that screening is more intense in those markets with more affluent customers. Therefore, the more
heterogeneous is the clientele base, the more effective tariff options are needed to successfully segment
the relevant groups and extract most of the informational rents from individuals with different willingness
to pay of the cellular service. This effect is common to both firms and the fact that it does not lead to
complementarity between effective tariff plans may suggest that the distributions of consumer tastes that
each firm confronts are not necessarily symmetric. Thus, the underlying distribution of consumer tastes
drives the offering of effective tariff options while imitation of the competitor happens mostly to match the
apparent offering of plans although some of them are actually always more expensive than other options
offered by the same cellular carrier.
These results could be questioned because APpeak, APoff−peak, and COVERAGE may not be exoge-
nous variables as the curvature measure depends on the tariff options actually offered and the decision to
participate in themarket is probably a function of themenu of tariff options available to different customers.
Fortunately, the Lagrange multiplier test o Wooldridge (1997) concludes that these three variables can
always be considered exogenous regressors. Thus, pricing has to be understood as the optimal strategy
to discriminate consumers with a given distribution of tastes.
Finally, and perhaps one of the most interesting results of these regressions is that the entrant
imitates selectively the pricing tactics of the incumbent, but only when referred to the non-dominated tariff
options. The later pricing of the incumbent while still a monopolist conveys valuable information to the en-
trant regarding the distribution of consumer types. It is not important for the incumbent as this firm already
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knows the distribution of customer tastes. And it is not important for introducing deceptive (dominated)
tariff options. Thus, free riding on the information about the market revealed by the pricing behavior of the
incumbent and the heterogeneity of the entrant’s customer’s valuations explain the correlation in effective
pricing, therefore ruling out strategic value to the number of effective tariff options as a way to segment the
market and steal consumers. Results show that if such strategic value to the actual way in which pricing is
implemented actually exists, it involves mostly dominated tariff options.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper has described the pricing tactics of competing firms in order to determine whether they can be
considered strategic complements or substitutes. Results support the idea of strategic complementarity
only when considering the total tariff options offered but not if we focus on the non-dominated tariff
options that approximate the optimal fully nonlinear tariff to screen among the heterogeneous consumers’s
valuations. This lack of complementarity among effective pricing strategies can only be explained by
underlying asymmetries of the distributions of consumer valuations since results also rule out the existence
of cost heterogeneity across firm types.
Thus, at least for an early industry, firms do not differentiate from each other through the design
of tariffs. This may happen, as indicated by Yang and Ye (2006) once the market is more crowded with
additional competitors. Some of the results reported by Economides et al. (2006) appear to indicate that this
is the case, but it is unclear from their evidence that this differentiation suffices to turn pricing tactics into
strategic substitutes when the industry matures.
The paper has also introduced an effective and easily implementable estimation method to obtain
consistent estimates in multivariate count data settings. This approach solves a long standing problem
in the multivariate count data regression literature and it allows to address series of counts that may be
both positively and negatively correlated. In addition it can also accommodate the effect of unobservable
heterogeneity leading not only to the common overdispersion of counts, but also to underdispersion.
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